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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
CLASS ACTIONS UNDER NEW RULE 23 AND FEDERAL
STATUTES OF LIMITATION: A STUDY OF
CONFLICTING RATIONALE
I. INTRODUCTION
A class action is a suit prosecuted or defended by one or more
members of a group on behalf of all other members of the group, the
purpose being to adjudicate, in a single action, disputes between the group
and an adverse party or group where it is impracticable to join all the
members of the group and bring them before the court.' Old Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 predicating its categorization
upon "the character of the right sought to be enforced," permitted three
types of class actions: "true," "hybrid," and "spurious." Actions under
Old Rule 23(a) (1) were "true" class actions "wherein, but for the class
action device, the joinder of all interested persons would [have been]
essential."'4 The class action was "hybrid," under Old Rule 23(a) (2),
when "in addition to the question of fact common to all, there [was], in
lieu of joint or common interests, the presence of property which [called]
for distribution or management." 5 "Spurious" actions under Old Rule
23(a)(3) occurred when the character of the right was "'several, and
there [was] a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief [was] sought.'"
1. See 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOnF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 561,
at 254 (rev. ed. Wright 1961) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1).
2. FZD. R. Civ. P. 23, before the recent 1966 amendment, provided in perti-
nent part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them,
one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may,
on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought
to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.
(c) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be
enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs. If the right is
one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be
liven only if the court requires it.
3. 3A . MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 23.02, at 3415 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter
cited as MOORE].
4. MOORE, 1 23.08, at 3435. See Developments in the Law - Miultiparty Litiga-
tion in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. Rsv. 874, 930 (1958).
5. MooR, 1 23.09, at 3439.
6. MOORE, 1 23.10, at 3442. For the potentiality of the use of the spurious class
suit see Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI.
L. RZv. 684, 699-701 (1941).
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These "right-oriented" categories, classified by Professor Moore and
accepted by the courts, were intended to be functional as well as descriptive
in that different effects were assigned to each type of class action.
7
While the holding in a true class action served to bind all members of
the class,8 and the judgment in a hybrid class action was binding on all
members of the class as to their rights in the specific property involved
in the action,9 a decision in a spurious class action bound only those mem-
bers of a class who were or who became actual parties to the action,' 0 thus
causing the spurious class action to be essentially "a permissive joinder
device."" Under Old Rule 23, an absentee class member generally became
an actual party to the action by intervening under Federal Rule 24.12
However, this raised problems when an absentee class member wished
to intervene at a time when the applicable statute of limitations would
have barred an individual action by him. These problems were rooted in
the different effects accorded judgments under the various types of class
actions,13 and the courts, in spurious actions, conflicted as to the circum-
stances under which intervention was to be permitted and as to the ap-
propriate time for intervention.'
4
The sweeping revisions of New Rule 23, at first glance, would
appear to put to rest the question of intervention in class suits.' 5 The former
categorization of class actions as "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" seems
to have been eliminated, and the "right-oriented" approach has been re-
placed by a method which permits a class action only under circumstances
7. MOORE, 1 23.11, at 3456.
8. MOORE, 23.11, at 3458. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S.
356 (1921).
9. MOORE, ff 23.11, at 3468-69. See Towle v. Donnell, 49 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1931).
10. MOORE, t 23.11, at 3465.
11. MOORE, J 23.10, at 3442. See Developments in the Law - Multiparty Litiga-
tion in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. Rvv. 874, 930 (1958).
12. See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. F.J. Young & Co., 3 F.R.D. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
13. See 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 127, 128 & n.3 (1962).
14. There seems to have been agreement that commencement of the suit tolled
the statute of limitations in both the "true" and "hybrid" class actions. 2 W. BARRON
& A. HOLTZOr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 568, at 315 (rev. ed. Wright
1961). See Richmond v. Irons, 121 U.S. 27 (1887). The division of authority con-
cerning tolling in the spurious situation will be examined in detail. See 76 HARV. L.
REv. 1675, 1676 (1963).
15. Donelan, The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Class Suit Under New
Rule 23, as Seen by the Treble Damage Plaintiff, 32 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. [formerly
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION] 264, 265-66 (1966) (footnote omitted). The author states:
Another obvious advantage which accrues to every member of the class at
commencement, whether he knows he's a member of the class or not, is tolling the
statute of limitations. If, in his discretion, a trial judge allows someone to join
the class three to four years after commencement of the action, and thereby sneak
in under the statute of limitations, the difference between substantive and pro-
cedural law will be in for some heavy scrutiny and I predict some very, very
heated arguments. This advantage also works to the benefit of those who, ignorant
of their rights, have failed to act sooner. Defense counsel will soon learn that
this same aid extends to the jackals who hang back until the tiger has downed
the stag ready for the kill. The miracle of an action under the new rule 23 is
that it tolls the statute of limitations for the dull, the lazy, the timid, the sly, and
if he is there among them, the unfortunate who has really been injured.
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which are deemed to make such an action appropriate. 16 The change in
the new rule that formally eliminates the category of "spurious" is the
provision that the judgment in a class action based upon a common ques-
tion of law or fact can operate conclusively on all members of the class.
17
But, notwithstanding the formal elimination of the spurious category,
in a class action maintained under New Rule 23(b) (3), the nature of the
class is the same as in the old spurious class action in that the rights
of the members of the class are several, and there are predominate ques-
tions of law or fact which are common to the members of the class.'8
Once the court determines that the action is maintainable as a class
action under 23(b) (3), it is bound, under 23(c) (2), to give notice to
all identifiable members of the class that unless they expressly request
exclusion they will be included in the class, and, that if upon receiving
notice no such request is made, they will be bound by the judgment.19
Thus, under the new rule, the spurious class suit is no longer a device
for permissive joinder,20 and an absentee no longer need take affirmative
action to intervene before he becomes an actual party to the action.
21
Once an absentee is identified as a member of the class and receives
notice, he would appear to be given a right to become a party for all
purposes.
22
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) lists four prerequisites which must be met in addition
to the conditions in 23(b) :
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member
that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by
a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include
all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who
does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through
his counsel.
See Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. Rnv. 629, 642 (1965).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) states:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
See Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the Development of
Amended Rule 23, 32 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 254, 261 (1966).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2), supra note 17.
20. See p. 371 supra.
21. See p. 371 supra.
22. See Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Gto. L.J 1204,
1223-24 (1966).
For purposes of proving damages, an absentee class member who is a party
to the action would not actually come before the court until after a favorable judgment
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Rule 23 is devoid of jurisdictional requirements. Therefore, one
would assume that notice will be given to an absent member of the class
regardless of the fact that he would be barred by the applicable statute of
limitations from bringing suit personally at the time he is presented with
the opportunity to request exclusion. 23 Because an absentee member must
take affirmative action only when he chooses to be excluded from the
class, if he receves notice and takes no action, he is automatically included
in the class and affected by the judgment. There is, however, one pre-
requisite for intervention in a class suit which was never a point of conten-
tion under Old Rule 23 and which seemingly will not prove troublesome
under New Rule 23. That is, the applicable statute of limitations must not
have been a bar to the absentee member's ability to bring an action at the
time the class action in which he is seeking to intervene was instituted.24
Thus, whenever this comment discusses intervention in class suits at a
time when the applicable statute of limitations would bar an individual
action by the absentee class member, a situation is referred to in which
the original action in the class suit was instituted prior to the time that
the absentee would have been barred by the statute from instituting his
own action.
Another point worth noting is that New Rule 23 gives the trial judge
added discretion in that an order concerning the propriety of designating
the action a class action may be altered or amended until such time as
there is a decision on the merits.2 5 Conceivably, a trial judge could open
a class action and allow additional plaintiffs to intervene years after the
statute of limitations would have been a bar to their individual suits.
The ability to become a party to the action at a time subsequent to
the individual's own statutory time limit would be of practical significance.
For example, in the area of settlement negotiations, rule 23(e) requires
court approval for such compromises and that notice of the proposed
compromise be sent to all members of the class. 26 Thus, a defendant con-
to the class were rendered. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F.
Supp. 673, 684 (N.D. Ind. 1966).
An absentee member may, if he does not request exclusion, enter an appear-
ance through counsel. FtD. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2), supra note 17. Such an appearance
would appear to be quite different from a personal appearance by the absentee for the
purpose of pressing his individual claims. Entry of appearance through counsel would
serve to bolster the original plaintiff's legal forces as well as decrease the latter's own
trial expenses.
23. See 2 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzorr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 568,
at 87 (rev. ed. Wright Supp. 1966) ; Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69,
99 (1966).
24. See, e.g., Slack v. Stiner, 358 F.2d 65, 70 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Escott v. Barchris
Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 732-33 (2d Cir. 1965); Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on
Lives & Granting Annuities v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941).
25. F9D. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides:
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as
a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
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templating settlement in a 23(b) (3) class action would be well advised
to consider whether absent members who would be barred from bringing
individual actions will be considered to be within the class and be notified
of the proposed compromise.27
The purpose of this comment is to examine the desirability of allowing
an absent member, who would be barred by the statute of limitations from
bringing an individual action, to become a party to the class action, and an
attempt will be made to determine whether such "intervention" is within
the scope of the new rule. Particular emphasis will be accorded the anti-
trust area where it is felt that New Rule 23 will have its most significant
effect.
28
II. CLASS ACTIONS: RATIONALE IN FAVOR OF TOLLING
A. Historical Development
The modern class action has its origins in the English common-law
courts. 29 Even earlier, the chancery court had developed the bill of peace
whereby, to avoid multiplicity of actions, repeated trials, delays, and
injustice, an action could be maintained by, or brought against, some
members of a group on behalf of the entire group when: the group was
so large as to make joinder impossible, the group was adequately repre-
sented, and the group had a common interest in the question to be
decided.3 0 The judgment in such an action was binding on the entire
group.
81
In the United States, in 1842, Equity Rule 48 82 was promulgated
and provided for a representative suit when the parties were so numerous
as to make joinder inconvenient. The major distinction from its common
law equity ancestor was in the provision that "the decree shall be without
prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties."8 3 Eleven
years later, Equity Rule 48's bar to a non-binding class action was con-
troverted in Smith v. Swormstedt. 4 In Smith, which involved a class
action to determine rights to a specific fund, the United States Supreme
Court held that since the rights and liabilities of the fifteen hundred
absent members of the class were adequately represented by the six
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
27. See generally 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICEt AND PRO-
CEDURE § 570, at 91 (rev. ed. Wright Supp. 1967).
28. See Donelan, supra note 15, at 264; Ford, supra note 18, at 254.
29. Z. CHAFES, SOME PROBLEMS ov EQUITY 200-01 (1950).
30. See Developments in the Law - Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts,
71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 928 (1958).
31. Z. CHAIEE, supra note 29, at 202-03, 224-25.
32. J. HOPKINs, NEw FEDERAL EQUITY RULES ff 48, at 104-05 (8th ed. Babbitt
1933).
33. This principle stems from West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718 (No. 17,424)
(C.C.R.I. 1820) (dictum), in which Justice Story reasoned that in the United States,
in addition to the English class action, another type of class action existed in which
the judgment did not affect the rights of those not before the court.
34. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
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members who were before the court, the absent parties could be bound
by the decree just as if they had been before the court.
38
In 1912, Equity Rule 38,80 which replaced Equity Rule 48, deleted
the clause which limited the binding effect of the class action. The Su-
preme Court, in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,37 took the position
that this omission eliminated the jurisdictional requirements of Equity
Rule 48; thus, absentees could be bound by the judgment in a class action.
Finally, Hansberry v. Lee38 firmly impressed upon the class action the
requirement of adequate representation. The Court found no constitu-
tional objection to permitting a class suit judgment to be res judicata
as to absent members; however, it was held that due process mandates
the adoption of procedures which adequately protect the interests of ab-
sentees. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was enacted substantially as
a restatement of Equity Rule 38,89 and the avoidance of multiplicity of
actions remained as the underlying purpose of the class action,40 particu-
larly for spurious class actions.41 "Like many another practice, necessity
was its mother. Its correct limitations must be ascertained by the experi-
ences which brought it into existence.f
4 2
B. Case Law Prior to New Rule 23 in Favor of Tolling
Richmond v. Irons48 is the case most frequently cited for the proposi-
tion that the commencement of a true or of a hybrid class action tolls
the running of the statute of limitations as to all members of the class.
44
The case, the earliest one in the area and the single Supreme Court case
on point, involved a creditor's bill in equity to discover the assets of a
national bank that was in the process of liquidation. The Court held
that the original action by a single creditor allowed any bona fide creditor
to intervene at a later date, notwithstanding the running of the statute
of limitations for an individual action by the intervenor. 45 The decision
was grounded upon the strong equitable considerations inherent in the
creditor's bill, the court pointing out that a decree for the payment of
debts under a creditor's bill is "considered as a trust for the benefit of
creditors. . .. ,,4" Since "every creditor has to a certain extent an inchoate
interest" in an action brought by another creditor, there is no need for
35. Id. at 302.
36. 226 U.S. 659 (1912).
37. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
38. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
39. Moon , 1 23.02, at 3410.
40. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 854n.6 (3d Cir. 1945); City of
Chicago v. Allen Bradley Co., 32 F.R.D. 448, 452 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
41. Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 1952).
42. Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1941).
43. 121 U.S. 27 (1887).
44. MOORE, ff 23.13, at 3476n.22; 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOvr, FEDERAL PRACTrCE
AND PROCEDURE § 568, at 315n.15.2 (rev. ed. Wright 1961).
45. 121 U.S. at 52.
46. Id. at 52-53.
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each creditor to institute an individual action.47 The prime import of the
Richmond case, for present purposes, is that subsequent cases have, by
analogy, applied the creditor's bill rationale to class actions generally.
48
The concept of proceeds being set aside in a separate and distinguishable
fund for an identifiable group, namely, creditors, was not only the rationale
for tolling the statute of limitations,49 but was also the sine qua non of
a true class bill.50
The creditor's bill rationale became firmly implanted in the class
action in Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.51 After labeling as "hy-
brid" the Securities Act 52 class action under consideration, the court
traced the history of the creditor's bill which was used, analogically, to
support its finding that a hybrid class action tolled the statute of limita-
tions.5 3 The court further stated:
To permit a "class" action to be brought, under Rule 23, and
then to bar members of the class . . . from later joining in the action
or from enjoying its benefits, is an inconceivable proposition. That
would operate to the detriment of members of the class . . . who had
been lulled into a sense of security in reliance upon Rule 23 which
. . . permits the bringing of class actions without making any dis-
tinction between "true," "spurious" and "hybrid" bills.5 4
In addition to the creditor's bill rationale, the concept of reliance emerged
as a significant factor from this case. Perhaps the strongest argument
in favor of tolling the statute of limitations is the fact that all of the plain-
tiffs knew of the action, and, relying upon the representative nature
of the suit to preserve their individual causes of action, did not bring
their own suits.
In Culver v. Bell & Loffland, Inc.,55 a case involving the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 56 the court rejected defendant's argument that, because
47. See id. at 53-54.
48. 34 COLUm. L. Rsv. 118, 130 (1934).
49. See Standard Oil Co. v. Swinney, 201 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Johnson v.
United States, 102 F,2d 729 (10th Cir. 1939); Marsh v. United States, 97 F.2d 327
(4th Cir. 1938).
50. See Kimble v. Board of Comm'rs, 32 Ind. App. 377, 391, 66 N.E. 1023, 1028
(1903) ; cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919) ; Hallett v. Hallett,
2 Paige 19 (N.Y. 1829). See note 122 infra for the impropriety of the continued use
of the creditor's bill rationale.
51. 39 F. Supp. 592 (E.D. Pa.), remanded, 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941). The
case illustrates the problems engendered by Old Rule 23's characterization of class
actions as "true," "hybrid," or "spurious." The case was extremely complex in that
there had been an appeal from the court's original decision on the validity and
characterization of the class action. 39 F. Supp. at 594-95.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77(l) (1964). On appeal, the third circuit labeled the action
"spurious." Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Deckert, 123
F.2d 979, 984 (3d Cir. 1941).
53. The court reasoned that even if the action were spurious, the statute would
still be tolled because for this purpose rule 23 did not distinguish between types of
class actions. 39 F. Supp. at 597.
54. Id.
55. 146 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1944).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964).
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the causes of action were dissimilar and therefore the pleadings did not
relate back under rule 15, 57 the statute of limitations barred would-be
intervenors. The decision to toll the statute in favor of the class action
was based upon the "avoidance of multiplicity of suits" rationale, as
well as on the fact that at all times the employer had the ability to identify
with particularity each potential plaintiff, and, therefore, had no need for
a specific complaint from each.5 The court also noted that the provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act encourage actions "by all employees
similarly situated." 59 Moreover, in the Fair Labor Standards area, the
success of the federal remedy may rest entirely upon the use of the class
action; thus, the policy in such cases is particularly strong in favor of
allowing the class action notwithstanding the running of the statute of
limitations. This is exemplified by Pentland v. Dravo Corp.60 where the
court reasoned that classifying the proceeding as a "spurious" class suit
furthered the congressional purpose underlying section 16 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act: "[E]mployees, if they wish, can join in their
litigation so that no one of them need stand alone in doing something
likely to incur the displeasure of an employer. It brings something of
the strength of collective bargaining to a collective lawsuit." 1 The equities
in a case of this nature seem to militate in favor of tolling the statute.
Measured by the judicial recognition it has received, 62 the leading
case for tolling would appear to be York v. Guaranty Trust Co.6" A
spurious class action was instituted by similarly situated note holders
against the defendant-trustee for breach of fiduciary' duty. The court,
focusing on the reliance by potential plaintiffs on the representative
nature of the class, stated in dictum:
Rule [231 unequivocally tells all persons having claims of the type
therein described that one or more of them may begin such a class
action "on behalf of all" when the "class" is "so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court." Any non-
accepting noteholders, relying on that assurance, were justified in
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c). In an individual action, after the statute of limitations
has run, an amendment to a pleading will not be permitted which brings in a new
party to the action. Wagner v. New York, 0. & W. Ry., 146 F. Supp. 926 (M.D. Pa.
1956); Anderson v. Brody, 7 F.R.D. 84 (E.D. Ky. 1946).
58. 146 F.2d at 31.
59. Fair Labor Standards Act § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1964). The court in
Culver stated: "The provisions of the Act permitting resort to representative suits
should be liberally administered by the courts, since encouragement of the practice
will redound to the advantage of employer and employee alike through avoidance of
a multiplicity of suits." 146 F.2d at 31. Accord, Kum Koon Wan v. E.E. Black,
Ltd., 75 F. Supp. 553 (D. Hawaii 1948); Wright v. United States Rubber Co., 69
F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Iowa 1946).
60. 152 F.2d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 1945).
61. Id. at 853.
62. See, e.g., All American Airways, Inc. v. Elderd, 209 F.2d 247, 248n.1 (2d
Cir. 1954) ; Newberg v. American Dryer Corp., 195 F. Supp. 345, 349 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
63. 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 90 (1945). The
case ultimately became the outcome determinative rule of the Erie v. Tompkins area.
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believing that plaintiff's suit was begun on their behalf although they
were not before the court. To hold that such noteholders cannot,
as to lapse of time, have the benefit, by intervention, of the institution
of the suit by plaintiff would be to convert the Rule into a trap.64
York, in addition to allowing intervention during a spurious class action
by tolling the statute of limitations, suggested a procedure which would
allow class members to intervene after a decision on the merits.65 The
rationale for this "one-way intervention" was based on the effect of a
judgment in a spurious class action. Since the judgment was res judicata
only to those members who had intervened, the court felt that to prohibit
members from intervening after an adverse judgment to the defendant
would be to convert the rule into a trap. Although sharply criticized by
Professor Moore,6 6 "one-way intervention" was approved in Union Car-
bide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley.67 Thus, an absentee member could await
the outcome of a case, and, if a favorable decision were rendered, he
would be permitted to benefit by the judgment without having been
exposed to the risk of an adverse decision. Through "one-way interven-
tion" the reliance concept was extended to intervention after judgment.
C. Case Law Prior to New Rule 23 Barring Intervention
One of the few cases to suggest that a spurious class action does not
toll the statute of limitations is P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Newman,6" an
antitrust case. The court, disregarding the contrary dicta in York, stated
that because the absentees in a spurious class action are not bound by the
judgment, "reliance upon the commencement of the action should not
free the claims of the absentees from the statutory bar."69 Thus, instead
of focusing on the nature of the spurious class action as did the court in
Deckert, the Husserl court emphasized its non-binding effect. It would be
fair to assume that because of the binding effect of judgments under
New Rule 23, the rationale of Husserl is no longer apposite; however,
this does not compel the conclusion that the statute must be tolled under
New Rule 23.70
The singular case which conclusively held that a spurious class action
does not toll the statute of limitations focused on the nature of the action
64. 143 F.2d at 529 (Frank, J.) (dictum). Accord, Mutation Mink Breeders
Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Contra, 2 W. BARRON
& A. HOuzZori, FZDERAL PRACTrMc AND PROCEDURE § 568, at 315 (rev. ed. Wright 1961).
65. 143 F.2d at 529.
66. Moon , ir 23.12, at 3476; accord, Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204
F.2d 331 (2d cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 994 (1953).
67. 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 810 (1962), noted in
76 HARV. L. Rzv. 1675 (1963) and 14 SYRACUSz L. Rv. 127 (1962).
68. 25 F.R.D. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
69. Id. at 267. The court indicated that in a true or hybrid class action all the
members are deemed to be before the court upon timely institution of the action by
a representative thereby preventing the statute from running. Id.
70. See p. 388 infra.
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rather than on the effect of the judgment. In Athas v. Day,71 a case
involving a violation of the Securities Act,72 the court stated:
If this were a true or hybrid class action, the only question would be
whether plaintiff adequately represented the class. If he did, the
statute of limitations would not bar their recovery. The spurious
class action, however, involves separate causes of action, and is a
matter of efficiency to avoid multiplicity of actions. Consequently,
each plaintiff must be able to avoid the bar of the statute of limita-
tions without reference to the other causes of action.
73
The Athas decision's reliance on the case of Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on
Lives & Granting Annuities v. Deckert,74 however, appears to have been
mistaken. In Deckert, a class action under the Securities Act was dis-
missed because of inadequate representation.75 In dictum, the court after
discussing intervention in the spurious and hybrid situations, concluded
that intervention would not be permitted in a spurious class suit.76 Athas
read Deckert as saying that an intervenor in a class action must apply
to intervene before the statute would preclude an independent action
by him. However, one authority has taken the position that the Deckert
case held that one is precluded from intervening only if the statute would
have run against his claim prior to the commencement of the original
class action.7 7 While the language in Deckert could support either interpre-
tation,78 upon examining the Deckert court's reasoning, one is impressed
with the difficulties of applying broad labels to determine when intervention
is proper. The impression one receives is that of a court groping for a
suitable rationale. In the district court, the action was termed "hybrid,"
and as noted,79 the cases involving the creditor's bill rationale were ana-
logized to the class action in order to allow intervention. In a spurious
suit, however, where the rights are several, the court is not on the firm
footing it is on in the hybrid situation where it can speak of the "inchoate
interest"80 of, and the "creation of a trust" 81 for, would-be intervenors.
Thus, the Deckert case illustrates the immense difficulty of attempting to
fit a square peg, the creditor's bill rationale, into a round hole, the spurious
class action. Deckert also shows the necessity for a case by case analysis,
71. 161 F. Supp. 916 (D. Colo. 1958).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
73. 161 F. Supp. at 919.
74. 123 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1941). This is the decision of the appeal of the Deckert
case which was discussed at p. 376 supra.
75. 123 F.2d at 983-84.
76. Id. at 985.
77. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES RGtULATIONS 33 (Supp. 1962). See p. 373 supra.
78. "[P]lanholder may not intervene as an additional party-plaintiff in the action
at bar at this juncture if he purchased his securities more than three years prior to
the commencement of the suit." 123 F.2d at 985. The failure to place an adjective
before the word "suit" may well explain the conflicting views.
79. See p. 376 supra.
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or, rather, a statute by statute analysis, to determine whether to toll a
particular statute.
8 2
D. Escott: A Possible Solution
Due to the absence of discussion of the policies inherent in statutes of
limitation, the prior case law lacks satisfactory analysis regarding the con-
flicting rationale between such statutes and class actions. On the eve of
the promulgation of New Rule 23, such an analysis was presented by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp.
8 3
The court, directly confronted with the question of whether or not
plaintiff-shareholders could intervene in a registration statement misrepre-
sentation action under the Securities Act,8 4 held that the spurious class
action tolled the statute of limitations.8 5 The rationale for this holding
was grounded in the weightier policy arguments favoring the class action
compared to those for the statute of limitations.8 6 The court stated that
since the class action was, for the purpose of aiding judicial administration,
designed to more efficiently handle large cases involving numerous plain-
tiffs, rule 23 should be favored and its use encouraged.8 7 Furthermore, it
was reasoned that rule 23 must be liberally construed because it is a "device
for vindicating claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify
legal action but which are of significant size if taken as a group."88
That in the securities regulation area the importance of protecting
the small investor may be the strongest policy argument for tolling the
statute is further evidenced by Harris v. Palm Spring Alpine Estates, Inc.:
"Indeed, it has been suggested that 'the ultimate effectiveness of the
federal remedies' in this area 'may depend in large measure on the appli-
cability of the class action device,' and particularly of the 'spurious' class
action provided by Rule 23(a) (3). ' '89 The rationale for tolling in this
situation is closely analogous to that for employee actions under the Fair
Labor Standards Act,00 and, in both types of actions, a court seemingly
will be sympathetic to the plaintiff's position and reluctant to allow the
defendant to assert a statute of limitations defense.
In arriving at its decision the Escott court also considered the rationale
underlying the statute of limitations, namely: (1) to prevent surprise, (2)
to prevent the loss of evidence, (3) to avoid memory failure of witnesses
82. See Slack v. Stiner, 358 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1966), where the conflicting policies
of Athas and York are presented.
83. 340 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub. norn., Drexel & Co. v. Hall,
382 U.S. 816 (1966).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1964) provides for a bar if the action is not instituted
within one year after discovery of the misrepresentation nor within three years
after the sale.
86. 340 F.2d at 733.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 329 F.2d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 1964), quoting 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS
1819-20 (2d ed. 1961).
90. See p. 377 supra.
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and the disappearance of witnesses, and, (4) to free defendants from stale
claims.91 These rationale, however, were found to be inapposite:
In the present case the claims were not allowed to grow stale. Before
the period of limitations had expired an action was instituted. The
defendants were thus made aware of the nature of the evidence that
would be needed at the trial. Since the action was brought on behalf
of all others similarly situated, the defendants were put on notice
of the possibility of claims aggregating the full sales price of all the
debentures. There can have been no occasion for surprise when these
additional plaintiffs sought to intervene.
92
Judge Friendly, in a convincing concurring opinion, attacked the
propriety of always subordinating the policies of the statute of limitations
to those of class actions, and he would limit the holding to the statute
of limitations in the Securities Act.93 Judge Friendly points out that,
ironically, the most efficient approach to the multiplicity of actions problem
would be to allow the statute to run, thus barring any future actions.
94
He urges that the vindication of small claims rationale for tolling the
statute is anamolous in that it allows a particular plaintiff to sit on the
sidelines while another plaintiff carries the complete burden of prosecuting
the action. However, if the statute would run, all plaintiffs would be en-
couraged to intervene, thereby giving the original plaintiff assurance of
financial support.95 The majority's finding that the original action provides
the defendant with adequate notice of the possibility of other plaintiffs
intervening is not entirely persuasive. Given the nature of the spurious
class suit - the enforcement of several rights having no unifying element
except common questions of law or fact 96 - as compared to the nature
of the true or hybrid class suit - the enforcement of a primary right com-
mon to all or a single fund for administration 97 - Judge Friendly notes
three specific difficulties which the majority opinion fails to resolve:
(1) the issue of concealment 98 can vary among individual plaintiffs, and
the institution of a class action by one plaintiff does not necessarily give
the defendant notice of what he must prepare on the issue of concealment
as to other potential plaintiffs; (2) each plaintiff alleges specific damages
which must be refuted by individualized evidence, and there is no notice
given to the defendant as to the damages claimed by any potential plain-
tiff; (3) a defendant may have defenses peculiar to a particular plaintiff
91. 340 F.2d at 734. See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of
the Class Suit, 8 U. CH. L. Rlv. 684, 712n.88 (1941).
92. 340 F.2d at 734.
93. 340 F.2d at 736 (concurring opinion).
94. Id. at 735.
95. Id.
96. MOORE, 1 23.10, at 3442-55.
97. MOORE, 1 23.08-09, at 3434-41.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 77m states in pertinent part:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k...
of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue
statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the
exercise of reasonable diligence. . ..
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or potential plaintiff, and the original notice does not apprise him of all
defenses he may have to raise.9 9 In these three situations memories may
have faded and witnesses may have disappeared, factors that comprise
the stale claims that statutes of limitation guard against.'00 Finally, Judge
Friendly points out that if it is assumed that one plaintiff, relying on the
class action, did not bring an action individually, it still remains that many
plaintiffs whom the statute is designed to bar will benefit by an encom-
passing holding that the statute is tolled as to all persons.' 0 In other
words, those plaintiffs who have not relied upon the class action in allowing
their claims to grow stale, as well as those who have so relied, will be
allowed to intervene.
The Escott decision would indicate that the best solution to the
problem of reconciling the class action and the statute of limitations is for
a court to take an interest-balancing approach. This analysis will be
considered later in the context of antitrust litigation.
III. NEW RULE 23 AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. General Considerations
Initially, there are a number of situations under New Rule 23(b) (3)
which must be noted where absentee members of a class may be able to
"intervene"; that is, situations in which they will be notified of the action
and will be effected by the judgment.10 2 The first opportunity to intervene
would present itself after the court determined that a class action is main-
tainable under 23(b) (3), the section in which the nature of the class
is the same as in the spurious class action under Old Rule 23.103 Under
23(c) (2), the court, notwithstanding the running of the statute of limita-
tions, would give notice to all identifiable members of the class, thereby
enabling them to be affected by the judgment. 10 4 Secondly, since rule
23(c) (2) provides for notice to identifiable members, if an absentee mem-
ber is overlooked in the notice procedure, but is subsequently found to be
a member of the class, he would upon the discovery of his membership,
be notified and permitted to be affected by the judgment. It might be
expected that such oversights will be quite common in nationwide anti-
trust suits involving hundreds of small companies. Finally, since an
order "may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits,"' 0 5 although a court may determine initially that
the action cannot be maintained as a class action, the action may subse-
quently be opened as a class action, thus allowing members of the class
to become parties notwithstanding the running of the statute of limita-
99. But see FD. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3), supra note 16.
100. 340 F.2d at 735 (concurring opinion).
101. Id.
102. See p. 372 supra.
103. See FSD. R. Civ. P 23(b) (3). See p. 372 & note 18 supra.
104. See p. 372 & note 17 supra.
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1). See p. 373 & note 25 supra.
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tions. As to the point of time at which notice is received, the federal
rules provide that it should be determined "[a]s soon as practicable"'10 6
whether or not a class action is maintainable. However, one commentator
has stated: "In the normal antitrust action, this will not be very soon. In
[Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.] Nisley,l07 it was not [determined]
until after trial. In short, it is going to be very hard to find an appropriate
class until you know a great deal about the law suit."' 08 Therefore, an
absentee member may not be aware of the action or may not act to obtain
his exclusion until the statute of limitations has long run as respects his
personal ability to initiate suit, yet he would still be a party to the action
and therefore affected by the judgment.0 9
A situation which hopefully will be avoided under New Rule 23110
is "one-way intervention," previously discussed in conjunction with the
York and Union Carbide cases."'. The Advisory Committee's Note to
New Rule 2 3 (c) (3) expressly excludes one-way intervention." 2 Hope-
fully, the class will be defined at an early stage of the proceedings, and
the judgment will be binding only on those determined to be in the class.
Intervention will not be permitted after judgment. The problem of
whether to toll the statute of limitations is still present; however, it
seems that potential plaintiffs will not be able to sit on the sidelines until a
winner is declared before joining the battle.
The question then is whether under New Rule 23 a tenable argument
can be advanced against tolling. More specifically, the issue is whether
the interest-balancing approach emanating from the Escott decision should
be utilized under New Rule 23. It would seem that the general purposes
of statutes of limitation mandate this approach. In Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, the United States Supreme
Court stated:
Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in
their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing
106. Id. See Lipsett v. United States, 359 F.2d 956, 958n.1 (2d Cir. 1966).
107. 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied sub. nom., Wade v. Union Carbide
& Carbon Corp., 371 U.S. 810 (1962) (footnote added).
108. Fales, Significance of Amended Rule 23 to the Antitrust Bar, 32 ABA
ANTITRUST L.J. 282, 288 (1966). See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69,
106-07 (1966).
109. It should be noted that where a member voluntarily excludes himself from
the class, there would appear to be no reason for tolling the statute as to him,
although no such distinction seems to have been drawn in the prior case law. See
Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the Development of Amended
Rule 23, 32 ABA ANTTrusT L.J. 254, 263n.49 (1966).
110. FsI. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(3).
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under sub-
division (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the
class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in sub-
division (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and
whom the court finds to be members of the class.
111. See pp. 377-78 supra.
112. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105-06 (1966).
COMMENTS
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/9
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to
slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and wit-
nesses, have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within
the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.11 3
The only real notice given to a defendant at the beginning of a class
action is that at some time in the future additional plaintiffs may or
may not decide to become parties to the action. "Notice" of such a limited
nature appears to controvert the policy enunciated in Railway Express,
and the issue to be considered is whether New Rule 23 can be interpreted
as requiring that notice be sent only to those members who would not
be barred by the applicable statute of limitations from instituting an
individual suit. A decision within a given statutory context should depend
upon the balancing of policy interests of class actions and statutes of
limitation.
1 4
B. Interest Balancing and Antitrust Litigation
New Rule 23 has been cynically described as a provision which will
stimulate the use of the private action in the antitrust area:
The golden era of antitrust which was the delight of the anti-
trust bar and the despair of the electrical equipment industry some
years ago, has waned. In the opinion of many, the tempo of anti-
trust activity has slowed in recent years. If the inherent advantages
of the New Rule 23 are realized to their full potential by treble
damage class plaintiffs, let me be the first to welcome you back to
the affluent world of endless depositions, national discovery programs
and large retainers. The best is yet to come." 5
The above commentator envisions the tolling of the statute of limitations
as one of the obvious advantages to private class plaintiffs." 6 The utiliza-
tion of an interest-balancing approach in the antitrust area, however, may
serve to dampen the spirits of treble-damage plaintiffs, as the following
analysis should demonstrate."
7
113. 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944). Accord, Isthmian Lines, Inc. v. Rosling, 360
F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1966). See Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations,
63 HARV. L. Rv. 1177, 1185 (1950). For an historical development see 1 H. WOOD,
LIMITATIONS, §§ 2, 4-5, at 4-12 (rev. ed. Moore 1916). See also p. 381-82 supra.
114. Needless to say, the argument in favor of such an approach would be stronger
when intervention is sought through the judge's discretion in opening a class action
rather than through the initial notice requirements under F41. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2).
For a discussion of the due process requirements concerning notice, see
Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106-07 (1966) ; Note, 51 VA. L. Rev. 629,
636 (1965).
115. Donelan, The Advantages and Disadvantages of a Class Suit Under New
Rule 23, as Seen by the Treble Damage Plaintiff, 32 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 264 (1966).
116. Id. at 265-66.
117. For a survey of other federal limitation statutes where the interest-balancing
approach may be utilized see Blume & George, Limitations and the Federal Courts,
49 Mich. L. Rrv. 937, 983-88 (1951).
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In Escott, the economic justification for balancing in favor of the
class action was the vindication of small claims,118 a justification which
would seldom be warranted in an antitrust action. While in the Fair
Labor Standards area, 119 and in the Securities area, 120 the individual
plaintiff with a small amount at stake is usual, in antitrust cases such a
plaintiff is the exception rather than the rule.121 Furthermore, the Clayton
Act provides for the vindication of claims of private plaintiffs by allowing
a treble-damage recovery plus "the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee."'
1 22
In balancing the policies of class actions and statutes of limitation
one must consider that in addition to a four year statute of limitations
for antitrust actions,12' the Clayton Act provides that whenever a civil
or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to prevent,
restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, the running of
the statute of limitations "in respect of every private right of action
arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter com-
plained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency
thereof and for one year thereafter.' 24 This section also provides that a
holding adverse to the defendant in a government action operates as prima
facie evidence of an antitrust violation in a private action against the same
defendant,'125 thus minimizing the private plaintiff's expense of amassing
evidence and eliminating his burden of proving violative conduct. "The
sole reason for [these provisions] of the Clayton Act was to stimulate
private antitrust suits and aid such private suitors.' 12 6 Any type of
interest-balancing in the antitrust area must take into consideration these
policies inherent in the antitrust legislation. In fact, several commentators
believe that the private action is the best means of effecting a forceful
antitrust policy.127 In light of these policies, it is arguable that the need
for effective antitrust enforcement outweighs the potential inequities
inherent in tolling the statute of limitations for absentee members. Such
118. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied sub. nom., Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1966). See p. 380 supra.
119. See p. 377 supra.
120. See p. 380 supra.
121. Fales, Significance to the Antitrust Bar of Amended Rule 23, 32 ABA
ANTITRUST L.J. 282, 284 (1966).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). The common interest of a class suit now being
centered in common questions of law or fact, 34 COLUM. L. Rgv. 118, 120n.7 (1934),
the creditor's bill rationale of the early cases is equally unsuitable for antitrust actions.
See pp. 375-76 supra.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964). See Comment, 23 WASH. & Lt L. Rgv. 353
(1966) ; Comment, 14 J. PUB. L. 232 (1965).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 16(d) (1964).
126. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d
346, 354 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1965). Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964), has been extended so as to toll the statute against parties
not named as defendants in the prior government action. Michigan v. Morton Salt
Co., 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966), noted in 55 Gno. L.J. 930 (1967).
127. E.g., Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions,
4 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1959) ; Loevinger, Private Action - The Strongest Pillar of
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tolling may then be viewed as just another way of realizing the congres-
sional conviction that "private antitrust litigation is one of the surest
weapons for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.' 2 s
Another factor for consideration in an interest-balancing approach is
the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Although the Supreme Court
has yet to rule on the point, the lower federal courts which have been
presented with the issue have agreed that, even absent an express qualifi-
cation in the statute, fraudulent concealment tolls the running of the
four year statute of limitations for private damage actions1 29 as a result of
a federal equitable doctrine to be read into every federal statute of
limitations.'8 0
Given the fact that the four year statute of limitations in an anti-
trust case is tolled initially by one of the above methods, a potential anti-
trust plaintiff would be hard pressed to place himself in an equitable
position where he could successfully argue that he should be granted the
added advantage of having the statute of limitations tolled as to him
by a class action instituted by some other plaintiff. The initial tolling
appears to fulfill the strong public policy considerations favoring private
antitrust actions, and the request for an additional period in which to bring
suit may not be viewed as simply another device to further the legislative
intent to foster successful antitrust enforcement. Support for the propo-
sition that an extension of time, in addition to that already provided for by
the act, is not in conjunction with public policy is evidenced by the legisla-
tive history of the pertinent sections of the Clayton Act:
While the [Advisory C]ommittee considers it highly desirable to
toll the statute of limitations during a Government antitrust action
and to grant plaintiffs a reasonable time thereafter in which to bring
suit, it does not believe that the undue prolongation of proceedings
of this type is conducive to effective and efficient enforcements of
the antitrust laws.
1 3 1
Also worthy of note is the Advisory Committee's caveat that notice
to members of the class under the new rule "is available fundamentally
'for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair
conduct of the action' and should not be used merely as a device for
the undesirable solicitation of claims.' 3 2 In the antitrust context, the
128. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S.
311, 318 (1965).
129. General Elec. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964);
Rinzler v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Public Serv.
Co. v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963) ;
Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 909 (1963). For the purposes of this discussion, the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment suspends the running of the statute until the discovery of the fraud. See
generally McSweeney, infra note 130; Note, 111 U. PA. L. Rev. 1214 (1963).
130. See McSweeney, The Statute of Limitations in Treble Damage Actions Under
the Federal Antitrust Laws - When the Period Begins and Tolling by Government
Actions and Fraudulent Concealment, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 717, 728 (1966).
131. H.R. RaP. No. 422, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955).
132. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 107 (1966).
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effect of notice, rather than to enable a group to bring an action, may
merely serve to provide leverage in settlement negotiations and to allow
counsel to take advantage of the "legitimized solicitation of claims."' 3
Another argument that would-be intervenors might raise to enhance
the contention that the interests balance in their favor in antitrust actions
would be that of reliance; that is, the class action would be converted into
a trap if in reliance upon the institution of the original action absentee
members refrained from bringing individual actions before the statute
ran, thereby prohibiting them from becoming parties at a later date and
preventing them from bolstering the original action by supplying additional
counsel and contributing additional counsel fees. This particular argu-
ment necessitates construing New Rule 23 to mean that reliance is a
prerequisite to an otherwise barred absentee member's right to receive
notice. However, the question of reliance, even if raised, seems to be
properly subordinated to the policies underlying statutes of limitation.
Using Judge Friendly's concurring opinion in Escott3 4 as a point of
reference, the determinative question would be whether the commence-
ment of the original action adequately apprises the defendant of the
absentees' claims.' 35 The nature of the antitrust action has certain inherent
characteristics which make particularly pertinent the rationale underlying
statutes of limitation; that is, surprise, loss of evidence, memory failure
of and disappearance of witnesses, and stale claims. 3 First, the parties
are usually corporations with extremely complex organizational schemes;
executive turn-over, death, and retirement can make it difficult, if not
impossible, to structure litigation which is dependent upon evidence that
must be gleaned from such sources. Secondly, the issue of damages is
of prime concern. With the possibility of a great many plaintiffs being
involved, the task of securing evidence to rebut every potential claim is
extremely difficult, and the institution of the original action cannot be said
to apprise the defendant of which plaintiffs will assert claims after the
statute has run. Furthermore, the fact that antitrust litigation is so pro-
tracted 37 intensifies each of the objections to tolling based on the statute
of limitations rationale.
The factors heretofore discussed as pertinent to an interest-balancing
approach for antitrust litigation - the inherent characteristics of antitrust
suits, the fact that individual defenses might be applicable to different
potential plaintiffs, 138 the lack of an economic justification favoring class
actions as exists in the Securities and Fair Labor area, the treble-damage
133. See W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 562,
at 72 (rev. ed. Wright Supp. 1966).
134. See p. 381 supra.
135. See Developments in the Law - Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts,
71 HARV. L. Rev. 874, 942-43 (1958).
136. See p. 380-81 supra.
137. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 165, at 45-46 (1967).
138. It should be noted that if the individual defenses are atypical a class action
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provision, the use of the government decision as prima facie evidence of an
antitrust violation, the four year statute of limitations, and the use of the
fraudulent concealment doctrine - seem to lead to the conclusion that
in antitrust actions the policies underlying the statute of limitations out-
weigh those underlying the favoring of class actions.
In addition to the considerations regarding class actions for anti-
trust suits and the rationale underlying statutes of limitation generally,
an interest-balancing approach necessitates an examination of the policies
underlying New Rule 23 itself. The purpose of New Rule 23, as was
the purpose of Old Rule 23139 and of class actions generally, 140 is to
avoid multiplicity of actions. The changes effected by New Rule 23 would
appear to be designed to further this purpose. By providing that all mem-
bers of the class who receive notice and who do not take affirmative action
to exclude themselves from the class are bound by the judgment, a maxi-
mum number of the class members are concluded by the class action
without ever appearing before a court. However, the utilization of the
interest-balancing approach is not inconsistent with the avoidance of
multiplicity of actions rationale of New Rule 23. If the interest has been
resolved in favor of non-tolling, the multiplicity of actions problem is
resolved because the running of the statute bars any future action. 141
Furthermore, any question as to whether the statute has in fact run for
a particular class member, in order to determine whether he should be
sent notice, can be answered by a brief appearance before the court for
this limited purpose only.
The necessity for applying an interest-balancing approach to anti-
trust actions, and for taking a long, hard look at statutes of limitation
policies, can also be inferred from the legislative history of the tolling
provisions for antitrust actions: "[I] n many instances the long duration of
[antitrust] proceedings taken in conjunction with a lengthy statute of limi-
tations may tend to prolong stale claims, unduly impair efficient business
operations, and over-burden the calendars of the court."
1 42
IV. SUBSTANCE V. PROCEDURE
An important remaining point for consideration is whether tolling
the statute of limitations by the initiation of a class action is validly within
the scope of New Rule 23.143 The Supreme Court's rule-making power is
limited by the enabling statute which provides that "[s] uch rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive rights .... "144 It must be
noted initially that even if an applicable statute of limitations were con-
sidered to be substantive, since New Rule 23, on its face, does not purport
139. See pp. 375-77 & note 59 supra.
140. See pp. 374-75 supra.
141. See p. 381 supra.
142. H.R. Rtp. No. 422, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955).
143. See note 15 supra.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
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to deal with the question of tolling, the rule itself does not affect sub-
stantive rights, and, therefore, is not within the proscription of the
Enabling Act. 145 However, if the rule is interpreted as requiring notice
to be sent to absentee members who would be barred from bringing indi-
vidual actions, an argument could be advanced that New Rule 23 is invalid
because, in its application, it abridges substantive rights. The issue would
then become whether the applicable statute of limitations confers a sub-
stantive right, and this issue revolves around the distinction between
"right" and "remedy."'1 46 Ordinarily, statutes of limitation bar the remedy
and not the right and, consequently, are viewed as procedural. Therefore,
the tolling of the statute by a class action under rule 23 would not "abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive rights." However, if the statute of
limitations is part of a statute which creates a liability for which there
was no common law remedy, the limitations provision is said to go to the
right as well as the remedy and, therefore, is substantive in nature.1 47
Thus, in the federal statutory remedies heretofore discussed, the applicable
statutes of limitation would be considered substantive.148
In Hanna v. Plummer149 the question arose as to the relationship the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have to the substantive-procedural
clash of the Erie doctrine.150 The Supreme Court indicated that the
federal rules must prevail over a conflicting state law, and that the
substantive-procedural boundaries delineated for purposes of the Erie
doctrine are not conclusive of those prevailing under the Enabling Act.151
Although Hanna established the supremacy of the federal rules over state
procedure, it is submitted that the conflict between the federal rules and
federal statutory rights with their own statutes of limitation is not
within the scope of Hanna, but will be considered in light of the tra-
ditional substantive-procedural dichotomy. 1' 2 The effect of Hanna, how-
ever, is to create a strong presumption in favor of the validity of the
federal rules. As the Court stated:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the ques-
tion facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided
145. See Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965).
146. See Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv.
1177, 1186 (1950) ; 7 WASH. & Lzr L. Rev. 237, 238 (1950).
147. Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 768 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Pennsylvania
Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979, 985 (3d Cir.
1941); Page v. Cameron Iron Works, 155 F. Supp. 283, 286-87 (S.D. Tex. 1957);
Cauley v. Massengill Co., 35 F. Supp. 371, 372 (D. Tenn. 1940).
148. The effect of New Rule 23 on applicable state statutes of limitation is beyond
the scope of this comment.
149. 380 U.S. 460 (1965), noted in 54 CALIF. L. Rlv. 1382 (1966).
150. Federal courts shall apply federal procedure and the substantive law of the
state in which they are sitting. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
151. 380 U.S. at 469-72.
152. The Court in Hanna reiterated the substance-procedure test promulgated in
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.: "[P]rocedure . . . [is] the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for disregard or infraction of them." Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460,
464 (1964), quoting Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). This test would be
the touchstone for an analysis under the Enabling Act.
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Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule,
and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court,
and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor consti-
tutional restrictions.1
53
In the wake of Hanna's fortification of the federal rules, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,'54 declared that the indispensable party doc-
trine, as enunciated in Shields v. Barrow,155 is substantive law which
accords a substantive right to be joined to a party whose interests may be
affected by the outcome of an action; therefore, rule 19156 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure could not, consistently with the Enabling Act,
alter the standards by which the existence of an indispensable party is
determined. The Provident court' 57 relied in part on the reasoning in
Perry v. Allen,1 8 a case involving a taxpayer's suit against the collector
for recovery of taxes allegedly erroneously assessed. The then existing
provision in rule 25(a) (1) requiring substitution within two years after
the death of a party was held invalid insofar as it attempted to abridge
the taxpayer's substantive right to bring his civil action to trial on its
merits by placing a categorical and inflexible time limit upon his right to
substitute the collector's administrator. 59 The court stated:
It is plain that these Rules are designed to provide the machinery
for the administration of justice, the modes of proceeding by which
legal rights are enforced; and do not purport to deal with the law
which gives or defines such rights, or their character, or the existence
or boundaries of the remedies vouchsafed for the establishment of
those rights .... 160
The instant problem is closely analogous to the Provident and Perry
situations. If the federal rules may not be used to deny joinder when
joinder is deemed a substantive right, a fortiori the rules should not be
used to allow a class member to become a party in the face of a substan-
tive statute of limitations which would prohibit it.
153. 380 U.S. at 471.
154. 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 940 (1967).
155. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129 (1854). The court defined indispensable parties as
persons who not only have an interest in the controversy but an interest of such a
nature that a final decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest or
leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. Id. at 139.
156. The case involved the indispensable party doctrine of Old Rule 19; however,
it is felt that the decision is also applicable to New Rule 19. See 12 VILL. L. Riv. 672,
673 (1967).
157. 365 F.2d at 814.
158. 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
159. Id. at 112. Cf. Local 370, Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Delaware,
L. & W. R.R. Co., 157 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1946).
160. 239 F.2d at 111-12.
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The Provident case is presently being reviewed by the Supreme
Court.161 In light of the superior status accorded the federal rules by
Hanna, the Provident decision may not be standing on solid ground. After
Hanna, there could be little argument that it is within the scope of the
Enabling Act "to regulate matters which, though falling within the un-
certain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of
classification as either.' u6 2 Both the indispensable party doctrine and the
statute of limitations were designed, at least in part, to facilitate the orderly
dispatch of judicial business, and, in this sense, are clearly procedural and
within the rule-making power.16 3  In fact, the right-remedy, substance-
procedure dichotomy of statutes of limitation has come under strong
criticism, 6 4 and recently the substantive limitations concept has been
abandoned in the case of fraud in the Fair Labor Standard area' 65 and
for fraudulent concealment in the antitrust area.1
6 6
As has been noted, the "substantive" characteristic of the statutes of
limitation under scrutiny is that they are either embodied in a provision
of the statute creating the liability or they apply specifically to a new cause
of action. 67 In either situation there is believed to be little doubt of the
legislative intent: "If Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for
enforcing a right which is created, there is an end of the matter. The
Congressional statute of limitation is definitiv."'168 Thus, it is Congress'
relating a specific statute of limitations to a specific statutory right that
labels the statute substantive; however, this seems small justification for
designating one statute procedural and another substantive. Because legis-
latures have formulated general statutes of limitation does not mean that
they intended these to be less effective, or less substantive, than specific
ones. Even a particular statute of limitations would seem to have little
effect when viewed in light of the Hanna decision. Thus, the tolling of the
statute of limitations by the institution of a class action would not appear to
make New Rule 23 invalid in its application. However, if Provident is
affirmed by the Supreme Court, a realistic argument might be raised that
tolling a "substantive" statute of limitations violates the Enabling Act. 6 9
161. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 940 (1967).
162. Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
163. See Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study in Judicial
Rule Making, 55 MicH. L. Rnv. 623, 629-30, 648 (1957).
164. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. Rtv. 1177,
1186-88 (1950).
165. Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949),
noted in 7 WASH. & Lpt L. Rxv. 237 (1950).
166. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575, 579
(9th Cir. 1964) ; Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 283
(8th Cir. 1962).
167. See p. 389 & cases cited note 147 supra.
168. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
169. New Rule 23 may also violate the limits of a procedural rule in that by
providing that a judgment is binding on class members, it expressly states the
substantive effect of the judgment. For a discussion of this point see Comment, 50
IOWA L. Rev. 1135, 1164 (1965).
COMMENTS
22




The proposal for an interest-balancing test stems from dicta in York
and from the concurring opinion of Judge Friendly in Escott. Not until
the Escott decision had there been a satisfactory discussion of the relation-
ship between, and the conflicting policies of, class actions and statutes
of limitation. Although the Escott court seemed complacent in allowing
the class action to subordinate the statute of limitations, the incisive con-
currence of Judge Friendly may indeed spark new life into the area.
In light of the strong policy considerations underlying the statute of limi-
tations, when the question of tolling the applicable statute is presented, it
would appear to be more desirable under New Rule 23 to utilize the
interest-balancing approach than to merely construe the rule as mandating
tolling.
The question remains as to whether the interests underlying a class
action should be balanced against: (1) the interests underlying statutes
of limitation generally, or (2) the interests underlying the statute of limi-
tations in a particular statutory scheme, or (3) the interests underlying
the statute of limitations as applied to each absentee class member. Balanc-
ing against statutes of limitation generally would result in the greatest
amount of predictability in that once the issue were authoritatively deter-
mined, no contrary argument could ever be advanced; however, this
approach would completely ignore the interests of individual absentees.
On the other hand, a case by case approach would appear to best pro-
tect the interests of individual parties; however, predictability would be
minimal. It would seem, therefore, that the best approach would be to
balance the interests underlying a class action against those underlying
the statute of limitations for a particular statutory scheme. Such an
approach encompasses the attributes of both other approaches in that it
would result in a reasonable amount of predictability and a reasonable
amount of protection of the interests of individual, similarly situated
class members.
Absent any decisions on point, the language of New Rule 23 would
lead the individually barred absentee to conclude that all possible avenues
to redress have not been closed. Nevertheless, given the considerations
underlying the statute by statute interest-balancing approach, the courts
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